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Domination of the global business world by U.S. companies has raised many legal issues all over
the world. In Ecuador, the issue arises regarding how to hold a U.S. oil company liable for contam-
ination of the indigenous lands and water. Texaco's contamination of the Oriente region of Ecua-
dor raises questions that affect Ecuadorian, international, and U.S. law. In Aguinda v. Chevron,
the provincial and appellate courts of Ecuador tackled the issues of procedure and liability for con-
tamination. Now that the lower courts have enacted a substantial judgment against Chevron for
its actions, the Ecuadorian and U.S. courts must tackle the issue of whether that judgment is
enforceable in the United States. With many similar cases arising in international litigation, a
decision by a U.S. court could either lay the stepping-stones for foreign plaintiffs to hold U.S.
companies liable or take away any hope for doing so.
Introduction
A history of expansive oil-industry-based contamination in the Oriente region of Ecua-
dor has been termed the "Amazon Chernobyl" because of the shocking extent of damage
to the environment and people.' But the actual contamination is only one small part of
the story behind Aguinda v. Chevron.2 The indigenous people of Ecuador brought suit
against Texaco, which subsequently merged with Chevron, for alleged environmental
damage and resulting increases in cancer and other illnesses in the region.3 The close to
30,000 plaintiffs brought suit in the Southern District of New York, but Texaco moved to
dismiss under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 4 Once the court determined that
* Kendal Payne is aJ.D. Candidate at the SMU Dedman School of Law, Class of 2014. She earned her
B.A. in Political Science and Spanish, cum laude, from Trinity University.
1. Christina Weston, Comment, The Enforcement Loophole: Judgment-Recognition Defenses as a Loophole to
Corporate Accountability for Conduct Abroad, 25 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 731, 731 (2011).
2. 142 F.Supp.2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), afTd, 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
3. Id. at 537-38.
4. Id. at 544.
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Ecuador would be a more suitable jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs filed suit there, Chev-
ron-who had become the named defendant-began questioning the moral and profes-
sional integrity of the Ecuadorian courts.5 The opposing parties not only fought each
other in court, but also outside of court, through accusations of bribery, extortion, and
deceptive practices. 6 Furthermore, Chevron has sought other means of settlement outside
of the Ecuadorian court system. 7 Because of the dramatic fashion with which this saga has
played out, journalists have described the trial as "more like a mystery thriller than a battle
of briefs."8 This case will have important implications for the future of mass-toxic-tort
claims stemming from U.S. companies' actions in foreign countries because of the ques-
tion of enforceability, the issue of the integrity of other nations' court systems, the dra-
matic backdrop, and the size of the judgment. 9
I. Factual Background
A. HISTORY OF TExAco AND CHEVRON IN ECUADOR
The story behind Aguinda v. Chevron started in 1964 when Texaco Petroleum (Texpet)
signed a contract to begin an oil operation in Ecuador with the nation's state-run oil
company Petroecuador.10 Texaco operated in Ecuador's oil industry until 1992, when its
consortium contract with Petroecuador ended (a year before the Aguinda plaintiffs filed
suit in New York)." Although Texaco began as the defendant in this lawsuit,
ChevronTexaco (typically referred to as Chevron), took over as the named defendant
when Texaco and Chevron merged in October of 2001.12 Because of the partnership with
Petroecuador and the changes in entity name and form, the actual source of contamina-
tion became an important issue for the fact stage of the Aguinda case in Ecuador.' 3 The
American entities-Chevron, Texaco, and Texpet-blamed the Ecuadorian entity Pe-
troecuador. 14 The plaintiffs blamed the American entities.' 5 The entity of today blamed
5. Weston, supra note 1, at 736.
6. See id. at 734-35.
7. See id. at 733 (describing Chevron's attempts to reach an end to this process through the American
Arbitration Association while the trial went on in Ecuador).
8. Simon Romero & Clifford Kraus, After 16 Years, Ecuador Oil Pollution Case Only Grows Murkier, N.Y.
TisIEs, Oct. 10, 2009, at A4.
9. See Weston, supra note 1, at 731 ("[Ihe largest judgment ever issued in an environmental case.").
10. History, TEXACO.coM, http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/background.aspx (last vis-
ited Jan. 5, 2013).
11. Timeline of Events, TEXACO.COM, http://www.texaco.com/sitelets/ecuador/en/history/chronologyof
events.aspx (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
12. Id.
13. Corte Provincial De Justicia De Sucumbios [CPJS] [Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios], 3/1/
2012, "Aguinda c. Chevron/ indemnizacion," Case No. 2011-0106 (2012-78-6) (Ecuador) (English transla-
tion of the decision filed in Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 423, 184 L. Ed. 2d 288 (2012), ECF No. 626-2).
14. Ecuador Lawsuit- Background, CHEVRON.COM, http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/background (last vis-
ited Jan. 5, 2013).
15. Corte Provincial De Justicia De Sucumbios [CPJS] [Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios], 14/2/
2011, "Aguinda c. Chevron/ indeinizacion," Case No. 2003-0002 (2011-63-1) (Ecuador) (English transla-
tion of the decision filed in Chevron Corp. v. Donzinger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb. 28,
2011), ECF No. 146-7).
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the entities of the past-Texaco and Texpet. 16 Furthermore, Chevron claimed that it did
not assume the liabilities of Texaco, and Texaco claimed it was not responsible for the
liabilities of Texpet, a separate entity.
17
On top of pointing fingers at different entities and parties, Chevron also claimed that it
did not hold liability for the contamination of the region because Texaco had remediated
mass amounts of damage in the past.' 8 According to Texaco, it completed a forty million
dollar remediation that was "fully inspected, certified and approved" by the Government
of Ecuador. 19 Furthermore, Texaco claimed that experts have shown that Texaco carried
out the remediation correctly and completely, leaving a "low health risk" to the inhabi-
tants of the area. 20 But according to Frente de Defensa de la Amazonfa and Amazon
Watch, two groups supporting the plaintiffs' cause, the "remediation" covered only 16
percent of the pits in question, included fake tests, and did not effectively remove the toxic
substances from the area.2
1
B. EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL
The entity recognition and success of remediation issues formed the basis for prelimi-
nary arguments, but do not come close to the depth and expanse of the arguments over
tests, expert opinions, and other evidence. The actual trial included 220,000 pages of
"more than 100 expert reports, testimony from dozens of witnesses, scientific data from 54
court-supervised inspections, independent health evaluations, and reams of legal argu-
ments."22 Chevron presented evidence that tests of the water at remediated sites turned
up samples that met Ecuadorian, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and World
Health Organization (WHO) standards 99 percent of the time. 23 The defendants also
stated that tests of the soil at these sites met the Ecuadorian standards 99 percent of the
time, but the statement does not mention EPA or WHO standards.24 Furthermore,
Chevron claimed that Dave Russell and Dr. Charles Calmbacher, experts hired by the
plaintiffs lawyers, stated that the testing results "did not support the allegations of envi-
ronmental contamination by Texaco." 25 Chevron went on to say that Calmbacher claimed
he did not write or sign the reports filed with the court under his name.
26 The provincial
court decided not to consider the Calmbacher reports in its judgment because of the con-
16. Id. at 3.
17. See id. at 12.
18. The Fraudulent Case Against Chevron in Ecuador, CHEVRON.COM, http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/
patternoffraud/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2013).
19. History, supra note 10. See also Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232 (2012) (describing TexPet's
remediation project).
20. History, supra note 10.
21. Amazon Defense Coalition, Summary of Overwhelming Evidence Against Chevron in Ecuador Trial,
CHEVRONTOxICO.cOM, 3 (Jan. 2012), http://chevrontoxico.com/assets/docs/2012-01-evidence-summary.
pdf. Sources published by these two groups state that "83 percent of Chevron's supposedly remediated pits
showed illegal levels of TPH," the carcinogen in question throughout the suit. Id.
22. Id. at 1.
23. History, supra note 10.
24. Id.
25. The Fraudulent Case Against Chevron in Ecuador, supra note 18.
26. Id.
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tention behind them.2 7 On top of this allegedly falsified report, Chevron claimed that the
plaintiffs' consultant only made "cursory examination of a small handful of sites" and at-
tributed all damage to Chevron instead of separating damage out between the Texpet and
Petroecuador consortium and the sole acts of Petroecuador.2s
On the other hand, the Ecuadorian inhabitants presented evidence from site inspec-
tions, expert testimonies, and eye witness accounts regarding the dumping of produced
water into the Amazon, unlined waste pits on Chevron sites, oil spills, and the resulting
health impacts. 29 Through site inspections, the Ecuadorian plaintiffs' consultants found
levels of Total Petroleum Hydrocarbon (TPH) that reached 900 times over the Ecuado-
rian standard, which is ten times more lenient than U.S. standards for TPH.3° Rodrigo
Perez Pallares, Chevron's "lead representative in Ecuador," conceded that Chevron had
dumped "at least 16 billion gallons of produced water" into the rivers and waterways of
the area.31 Furthermore, the plaintiffs' team claimed that Chevron utilized and then aban-
doned unlined pits that leaked toxins, damaging the environment and the health of the
community. 32 Plaintiffs further claimed that Chevron knew of the damaging effects of
these unlined pits, but chose not to remedy the situation because of the costs. 33 According
to the Amazon Coalition, Chevron's environmental auditors, Fugro McLelland and
H.B.T. Agra, admitted that the company did not have a plan to stop or remedy the oil
spills that occurred in the region. 34 In judging the mass amounts of evidence, the court
did not consider the opinion-based statements of experts because of the contention and
commotion surrounding each expert testimony; the court only looked to the technical
statements in these expert testimonies. 35
On top of evidence of the actual contamination, the plaintiffs presented evidence of the
long-lasting health and environmental effects from this contamination. The indigenous
and impoverished people of the region relied and still rely on the rivers of the area for
drinking, cooking, bathing, and fishing.36 The Amazon Coalition, in summarizing the
evidence used in trial, listed numerous known "human carcinogens and toxins" that exist
in TPH and other toxic substances found at the inspected sites and stated that the court
used materials from the U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry to assess
27. Corte Provincial De Justicia De Sucumbios [CPJS] [Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios], 14/2/
2011, "Aguinda c. Chevron/ indemnizacion," Case No. 2003-0002 (2011-63-1), at 50 (Ecuador) (English
translation of the decision filed in Chevron Corp. v. Donzinger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb.
28, 2011), ECF No. 146-7).
28. Histsy, supra note 10.
29. Aguinda c. Chevron, No. 2003-0002, at 165-74.
30. Amazon Defense Coalition, supra note 21, at 3 (noting that nearly 800 samples of actual pits showed an
average of 20,033 mg/kg of TPH and nearly 1000 samples of areas around those pits showed an average of
5247 mg/kg of TPH; Ecuadorian laws and regulations allow 1000 mg/kg of TPH).
31. Id. at 1.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 2.
34. Id.
35. Corte Provincial De Justicia De Sucumbios [CPJS] [Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios], 14/2/
2011, "Aguinda c. Chevron/ indemnizacion," Case No. 2003-0002 (2011-63-1), at 39 (Ecuador) (English
translation of the decision filed in Chevron Corp. v. Donzinger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb.
28, 2011), ECF No. 146-7).
36. Amazon Defense Coalition, supra note 21, at 1.
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the nature and impact of these substances.37 The plaintiffs used expert opinions, testi-
mony from alleged victims, and scientific data to show that the substances released into
the area by Texaco caused increased cases of cancer and other detrimental health issues.
I. Legal Background
Judge Nicolas Zambrano Lozada of The Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios pub-
lished a nearly 200-page decision on February 14, 2011.38 This decision discussed in great
detail numerous procedural issues on top of the exhaustive amounts of evidence presented.
The main issues that the court addressed included: (1) jurisdictional issues; (2) factual
issues based on evidence of contamination, remediation, and health results; (3) numerous
allegations of fraud and deceptive practices; and (4) issues of "procedural misconduct."
39
The court held Chevron liable for contamination of the Oriente region and the resulting
health and environmental damages. 40 Because even Chevron representatives admitted
that Texaco created contamination in the area, the main points of contention during the
trial involved liability and procedural issues. The court addressed whether Chevron
would be liable for the contamination, what standard to use to determine liability, how to
address the parties' alleged "procedural misconduct" during the trial phases, how to ad-
dress the parties allegations of fraud, and how to calculate damages based on the conclu-
sions to these questions.4' Ultimately, the court held Chevron liable for Texaco's actions
in Ecuador, it used a combination of subjective and objective standards, applied strict
liability, determined that Texaco's actions caused serious environmental and health dam-
age, and that the "procedural misconduct" and other aspects of misconduct would be fac-
tored into punitive damages.42 The Ecuadorian court looked to various standards used in
U.S. law in adjudicating this case.43
A. THE COURT'S ANALYSiS
Because all parties agreed that Texaco had spilt oil, dumped "produced water," and
operated dangerous unlined pits, the questions before the court on this matter were:
(1) whether Chevron can be held liable for the contamination; (2) what effects the con-
tamination had on the health, culture, and community of the area; and (3) whether Tex-
aco's actions actually caused these effects. After outlining the specific provisions in the
consortium contract, laws, and regulations that Texaco violated in their contaminating
actions, the court described its holdings regarding these issues. 44 The court decided to
37. Id. at 3.
38. See Aguinda c. Chevron, No. 2003-0002, at 2.
39. Amazon Defense Coalition, supra note 21, at 1-4.
40. Aguinda c. Chevron, No. 2003-0002, at 171.
41. Id. passim.
42. Id. at 186.
43. Id. passim.
44. The Ecuadorian laws violated include the Health Code of 1971, the Water Law of 1972, and the
Regulation of Hydrocarbon Operations Law of 1987. Id. at 62-64, 66, 70. The provisions of the contract
that Texaco violated included a clause that states Texaco could not deprive "the towns of the water volume
that is indispensable for them for their domestic and irrigable necessities, neither making difficult the naviga-
tion, nor taking the drinkable and purity qualities of the waters, nor preventing fishing." Id. at 62.
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use a two-part test with subjective and objective elements in order to rule whether Chev-
ron could be held liable for the contamination. 45 The court asked whether a "good oil
company" would have acted in a way to produce such results and whether Texaco acted
reasonably in its specific circumstances. 46 To judge the first, objective element, the court
consulted Primer of Oil and Gas Production, a 1962 book published by the American Oil
Institute that details the "extreme care" with which produced water should be disposed.47
This book also proved helpful in judging the second, subjective element because Texaco
representatives contributed to the work.48 Furthermore, Texaco created a patented "rei-
njection" technique for carefully disposing of produced water, but this technology was not
utilized in Ecuador, allegedly because of the high cost and lack of will. 49 To further justify
its decision that Texaco did not act reasonably in operating its oil operation as it did, the
court discussed evidence showing Texaco was aware that it had violated Ecuadorian law-
specifically, fines and penalties Texaco had sustained over the years.50
Once the court determined that a reasonable oil company in similar circumstances
would not have acted as Texaco did, and that Texaco itself had not acted reasonably in its
actions, the court then turned to the question of what further standards to impose upon
Texaco. The court, looking to U.S. law, determined that strict liability applied to Texaco's
actions and Chevron's liability in this case.5 1 The Ecuadorian provincial court looked to
U.S. tort analysis and "risk theory" in deciding to impose strict liability on Chevron.5 2
Because the oil industry proves inherently dangerous and high-risk, and because the plain-
tiffs burden of proving fault is high, the court imposed strict liability on Chevron in this
case.53 Similarly, the court looked to U.S. tort analysis in analyzing probable cause to
determine that Texaco's actions caused the contamination and health defects of the area.54
To fully explain its rationale behind finding Chevron liable, the court then addressed
each of Chevron's defenses. Chevron attempted to present evidence that it had not taken
on the liabilities of Texaco because it had never actually merged with Texaco.55 The court
easily dispelled with this defense by discussing numerous documents and statements prov-
ing the merger between Texaco and Chevron. 56 On top of this evidence, the court looked
to U.S. corporate veil piercing statutes and analysis to determine that Chevron could be
45. Id. at 81-82.
46. Id. at 81.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 82.
49. Here, the court cited to a correspondence between Texaco employees stating that the officials knew that
the methods used in Ecuador were unsafe for the environment and surrounding people but that the alterna-
tive was not as "efficient and profitable" as the unlined pits. Id. at 161-64.
50. Id. at 79-80.
51. Id. at 83.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 83-86.
54. Id. at 87-88.
55. Corte Provincial De Justicia De Sucumbios [CPJS] [Provincial Court of Justice of Sucumbios], 14/2/
2011, "Aguinda c. Chevron/ indenmizacion," Case No. 2003-0002 (2011-63-1), at 7 (Ecuador) (English
translation of the decision filed in Chevron Corp. v. Donzinger, No. 11 Civ. 0691 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. filed Feb.
28, 2011), ECF No. 146-7).
56. This evidence included public statements, documents of the change of name in the entity, and other
documents and statements showing that Chevron and Texaco considered themselves one, new entity. Id. at 9-
11.
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held liable for the past actions of Texaco. 57 The court rejected Chevron's claim that Pe-
troecuador was to blame by stating that Chevron and Petroecuador were joint and sever-
ally liable for the contamination, so Chevron would have to seek indemnity or
contribution from Petroecuador in a separate suit.58
Once the court determined that Chevron was liable for the contamination of the area,
that Texaco's actions caused severe environmental and health damages in the area, and
after it judged Chevron's defenses, it looked to the question of damages. The court not
only contemplated the past health damages, but also "reasonably foreseeable" future dam-
ages. 59 Although the court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments for "cultural damages" and
"loss of land," it did take into account their arguments for forced displacement when
calculating damages. 60 In the end, the general health care award amounted to $800 mil-
lion. 6 ' Although the court rejected the plaintiffs' request for forty billion dollars in puni-
tive damages, it did award 100 percent of remedial damages as a punitive damage award.,'2
On top of physical evidence and legal tests, the court judged the parties' "procedural mis-
conduct" in calculating the end damages. For example, the court noted that Chevron
obstructed the discovery phase by failing to turn over important documents and unfairly
prolonged the judicial process through bad-faith delays. 6 3 This "procedural misconduct,"
on top of Chevron's numerous and public attacks on the integrity of the Ecuadorian court,
factored into the court's award of punitive damages. 64 The final judgment awarded $8.6
billion to the plaintiffs, with an additional $8.6 billion in punitive damages if Chevron did
not apologize without fourteen days of the judgment, which they did not.65
III. Practical Analysis and Implication
Strictly based on the evidence presented and the application of law, the court made the
correct decision in finding Chevron liable for contamination and health damages caused
by Texaco's oil operation in Ecuador. Chevron's own representatives conceded that Tex-
aco had dumped toxic oil and other harmful substances into the environment of Ecua-
dor.66 Furthermore, Chevron moved to remove the case from the United States, so the
court's decision that it had jurisdiction over the case was correct and fair.67 But the court
did not take into consideration many elements of the law that might apply to the case at
hand and might make the court's judgment more enforceable and legitimate in the eyes of
the American courts and public. Since the rendering of the judgment, the main critiques
have arisen from questions of the legitimacy and enforceability of the decision. 68 Because
57. Id. at 13, 16, 20-22, 24-25.
58. Id. at 123.
59. Id. at 76.
60. Id. at 152-54.
61. Id. at 184.
62. Id. at 185-86.
63. Id. at 35-36.
64. Id. at 185.
65. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 236 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
66. Aguinda c. Chevron, No. 2003-0002, at 163.
67. Id. at 17-18.
68. CNN Wire Staff, Chevron Appeals $8.6 Billion Ruling, CNN (Jan. 21, 2012, 7:39 AM), http://www.cnn.
com/2012/01/2 I/world/americas/ecuador-chevron-lawsuit/index.htmnl.
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of other cases that have come under similar critiques, the Ecuadorian court should have
foreseen this issue and attempted to eradicate it through the decision. First, the court did
not discuss any international treaties on environmental law or human rights that would
apply to the case at hand. Second, the court did not take all the steps that it could to
eradicate the widespread distrust of the system and parties that were promulgated by both
parties' attacks on the integrity of individuals and the court.
A. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON THE ENVIRONMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Several international treaties on environmental law, as well as human rights, apply to
this case. Because of the vast impacts on the lives of the individuals in the Oriente region,
human rights questions regarding the deprivation of health and safety apply to Texaco's
actions in its oil operation. Various nations of the world have signed numerous interna-
tional treaties on the oil industry, contamination of indigenous land, and other topics that
apply to this case, but the United States has signed none of the main treaties on this
subject matter.69 Because the United States has not signed these agreements between
other nations, the standards set forth by the treaties are not enforceable against the United
States. 70 But the Ecuadorian court in Aguinda missed an opportunity to increase its judg-
ment's legitimacy and enforceability by including references to these international treaties
and agreements. For example, in 1994, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimi-
nation and Protection of Minorities under the United Nation's Economic and Social
Council's Commission on Human Rights published a report regarding how important the
environment and its effects on human rights had become to the United Nations.7' This
report also summarizes other major international agreements and publications that discuss
the link between environmental issues and human rights. 72 The Special Rapporteur who
wrote this report on behalf of the Sub-Commission emphasized the importance of the
human rights issues intertwined with environmental issues in regards to indigenous com-
69. See Carmen Otero Garcfa-Castrill6n, International Litigation Trends in Environmental Liability: A Euro-
pean Union-United States Comparative Perspective, 7 J. PRIVATE INT'L L. 551, 557-58 (2011).
70. See id. at 577.
71. Special Rapporteur on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Review of Further
Developments in Fields with Which the Sub-Commission Has Been Concerned: Human Rights and the Environment,
1, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (July 6, 1994) (by Fauna Zohra Ksentini).
72. This summary lists Articles 22, 25, and 28 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; Article 18 of
the Proclamation of Tehran; Articles 1, 7, 11, 12, and 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural rights; Articles 1, 7, 17, and 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; Articles
5, 7, 10, 11, 12, and 14 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women;
and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of
their families. Id. 34-46; see Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (IM) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/217(If), arts. 22, 25, 28 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316, arts. 1, 7, 11, 12, 15 (Dec. 16, 1966); International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, arts. 1, 7, 17, 20 (Dec.
9, 1966); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Annex to G.A.
Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014, art. 5 (Dec. 21, 1965); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Annex to G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, arts. 5, 7, 10-12, 14 (Dec.
18, 1979); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990).
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munities, like that of the Oriente. 73 While some of these agreements-such as the 1960
Convention on Third-Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, the 1963 Brussels
Convention, and the 1963 and 1997 Conventions on Civil Liability for Nuclear Dam-
age-only speak to environmental issues in general, others-such as the 1969, 1976, 1992,
and 2000 International Conventions on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage-speak
to oil contamination specifically. 74 Although applying only to maritime oil pollution, such
specific conventions on oil pollution include many ideas that the court could have used to
reinforce its decision. For example, the 1969 Convention imposes strict liability for ship
owners whose ships are involved in maritime oil pollution.75 This fact could have helped
the people and courts of the United States respect the Ecuadorian court's decision to
apply strict liability. Although these treaties and agreements bind neither the courts of
Ecuador nor the United States, their impacts on international environmental law could
aid the Ecuadorian court in gaining respect for its decision. Since the judgment, Chevron
has claimed that the Ecuadorian court has no power to enforce the judgment, claiming
that the decision was unfair and corrupt. 76 By backing up the court's decisions with
respected international materials, the court could have gained some respect and better
ensured that the judgment would be enforced in the United States and that Chevron
would pay the awarded damages.
B. CLAIMS OF FRAUD, BRIBERY, AND OTHER DEVIOUS AcTjVI
On top of citing to international materials on environmental law, the court should have
better addressed the issues of bribery, forgery, and fraud. While the court did address
Chevron's attacks on the integrity of the court in assessing punitive damages and did not
consider the expert opinions of contested expert witnesses, it could have gone further to
eradicate the drama that surrounded the case. A vast majority of news stories covering the
case focused on "[t]he two mysterious businessmen who used watches and pens implanted
with bugging devices" to record conversations in which the plaintiffs' representatives al-
legedly bribed the judge hearing the case. 77 Once this news came out and spread across
South America and the United States, additional reports emerged that the "mysterious
businessmen" were "entrapped in a dirty-tricks campaign by Chevron." 78 The men,
namely Patricio Garcia, claimed that Chevron developed an espionage strategy for helping
its cause.79 Furthermore, Chevron accused the plaintiffs' attorneys of forging some of the
plaintiffs' signatures when adding them to the complaints. 80 Chevron claims that Maria
73. Id. 75.
74. Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy of 29th July 1960, 956 U.N.T.S.
251; Convention of 31st January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July 1960, available at
http://www.oecd-nea.orglaw/nlbrussels.html; Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, May 21,
1963, available at http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/liability.html; International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, 973 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 1969
Convention].
75. 1969 Convention, supra note 74, art. I][.
76. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev'd sub nom. Chevron Corp. v.
Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 234 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
77. Romero & Krauss, supra note 4, at A4.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. The Fraudulent Case Against Chevron in Ecuador, supra note 18.
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Aguinda, the named plaintiff, admitted to believing she was signing an unrelated docu-
ment when she signed onto the lawsuit and that the lawyers forged twenty of the forty-
eight plaintiffs' signatures.81 On top of claiming that the plaintiffs' lawyers had bribed the
judge, Chevron claimed that the lawyers also had blackmailed him.82 Chevron alleged
that the plaintiffs' representatives wrote reports for expert witnesses to present as their
own and that they even ghostwrote the actual opinion.8 3 To defend its legitimacy and
integrity, the court should have addressed these issues more in the opinion by discussing
the weight of the evidence, how it affected the decision, and other proof of legitimacy.
The Ecuadorian court lacked the hindsight available today, but similar cases then pub-
lished and Chevron's continuous attacks on the Ecuadorian court's legitimacy should have
prompted the court to take extra steps. 84
C. RAMIFICATIONS
Once the Ecuadorian courts had rendered decisions at the provincial, superior, and ap-
pellate court levels, the focal point for the media shifted from the bribes and fraud to the
enforceability of the decision. On top of seeking redress through other means such as
arbitration, Chevron then claimed that the Ecuadorian court could not enforce its deci-
sion on Chevron's assets. 85 Chevron went so far as to seek and win a temporary order
from a U.S. court to delay the enforcement of any judgment published in Ecuador.8 6
Chevron also asked the Ecuadorian court to wait to enforce the decision, which the plain-
tiffs' spokesperson claimed would violate Ecuadorian law.87 The U.S. Supreme Court has
refused to consider Chevron's appeal to block the judgment.88
The issue of the enforceability of foreign court decisions in mass toxic tort claims has
rarely been addressed by U.S. courts. 89 But, this area of the law has gained more attention
recently because of large companies' attempts to avoid liability for mass toxic tort claims.
Several recent cases have concerned scenarios similar to Aguinda, in which a group of
plaintiffs brings a mass toxic tort claim against a large U.S. company, the company moves
to transfer the case to a foreign country, and then the U.S. company claims that the for-
eign court's adverse decision is not enforceable. 90 Lawyers and reporters have dubbed this
fact sequence the "enforcement loophole"-meaning, "the corporate defendant's practice
81. Id.
82. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 611-12.
83. Id. at 636-37.
84. See Osorio v. Dole Food Co., 665 F. Supp. 2d 1307, 1345 (S.D. Fla. 2009), affdsub nora Osorio v. Dow
Chemical Co., 635 F.3d 1277 (1 1th Cir. 2011). See also Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1413 (9th
Cir. 1995).
85. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 624, 625-26.
86. Chevron v. Naranjo, 667 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012).
87. Mercedes Alvaro, Law Journal. Chevron Appeals Ecuador Ruling in Amazon Case, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23,
2012, at B7.
88. Chevron Corp. v. Naranjo, 133 S. Ct. 423 (2012); see also CNN Wire Staff, Supreme Court Won't Con-
sider Blocking $18B.Judgment Against Chevron, CNN (Oct. 24, 2010, 10:43 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/
10/10/world/americas/chevron-ecuador-lawsuit/index.htnl.
89. Paul V. Majkowski, The Recognition of"Ordinary"Mass Toxic Torts, MASS TORTS LTG. (A.B.A. Section
of Litig., Mass Torts Litig. Comm., Chicago, IL), May 21, 2012, at 14, 17.
90. See id. (citing Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 382-84 (E.D. La. 1997), and Amlon
Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F. Supp. 668, 671 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
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of using the standard defenses to foreign country judgment recognition available in the
United States for an unintended purpose: to circumvent accountability abroad."91 A U.S.
court can render a foreign judgment unenforceable if the U.S. court is unsatisfied with the
procedures or characteristics of the court in question, or if the U.S. court believes the
decision to be unfair for other reasons. 92
Historically, it has been fairly easy for large U.S. companies to win a decision of unen-
forceability because "it is often particularly difficult to reconcile American due-process
concepts with foreign proceedings." 93
IV. Conclusion
The enforceability of the Ecuadorian judgment in Aguinda is important because the
decision has the potential ramification of increasing mass toxic tort claims against large
U.S. companies if a U.S. court rules the Aguinda judgment enforceable. But a U.S. court
decision rendering the Ecuadorian judgment unenforceable could have the opposite ef-
fect. A U.S. court decision denying the enforceability of a foreign court's decision could
have serious implications not only for the courts of Ecuador, but also for those of other
foreign nations. Stating that a foreign country's legal system is inferior, corrupt, unfair, or
immoral and thus "entitled to no respect from the courts" of the United States "is a partic-
ularly weighty matter." 94 With such strong factual evidence of Texaco's contamination of
the Oriente region of Ecuador, serious implications for international law would develop if
Chevron escaped liability and the damages awarded by Ecuadorian courts.95
91. Weston, supra note 1, at 735.
92. The eight reasons include:
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not provide impartial tribunals or
procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant;
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter;
(4) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did not receive notice of the proceed-
ings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(5) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(6) the cause of action or claim for relief on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the
public policy of the United States;
(7) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment;
(8) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an agreement between the parties under
which the dispute in question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in that court; or
(9) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service, the foreign court was a seriously
inconvenient forum for the trial of the action.
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMEN'IrS RECOGNITION AcT, § 4(c)-(d), 13 U.L.A. 261 (1962).
93. Weston, sapra note 1, at 741-42.
94. Majkowsld, supra note 89, at 15.
95. Since 2005, the American Law Institute has been working on a federal statute regarding the recognition
of foreign judgments. No actual legislation has been proposed to Congress, but hearings have been held in
Congress. See id. at 244.
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